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Abstract: 
Is the Environmental Police (EP) the solution to close the remaining gaps preventing an 
effective Environmental Protection Law (EPL) implementation? By analyzing the different 
concepts behind and needs for a Chinese EP, this question is answered. The Environmental 
Protection Bureau (EPB) has the task of establishing, implementing, and enforcing the 
environmental law. But due to the fragmented structure of environmental governance in China, 
the limited power of the EPBs local branches, e.g. when other laws overlap with the EPL, low 
level of public participation, and lacking capacity and personnel of the EPBs, they are 
vulnerable and have no effective means for law enforcement. An EP could improve this by 
being a legal police force. Different approaches have been implemented on a local basis, e.g. 
the Beijing or Jiangsu EP, but they still lack a legal basis and power. Although the 2014 EPL 
tackled many issues, some implementation problems remain: The Chinese EP needs a superior 
legal status as well as the implementation of an EP is not further described. It is likely that the 
already complex police structure further impedes inter-department-cooperation. Thus, it was 
proposed to unite all environment-related police in the EP. Meanwhile the question will be 
raised, which circumstance is making large scale environmental pollution possible and which 
role environmental ethics play when discussing the concept of EPs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Chinese government is well aware of the environmental trade it has made for allowing the 
fast economic growth during and after the Deng Xiaoping era. The environmental protection 
gained its momentum in the late 1990s and is a much-discussed political topic.1 After the 
environmental protection law has been revised in 2014, its implementation hasn’t brought the 
desired outcomes yet – mostly due to the low law enforcement capabilities and charges towards 
the local Environmental Protection Bureaus 2  (EPB) and China’s complex administrative 
structure and responsibilities. To accelerate the implementation of the new environmental law 
and to strengthen the authority of the environmental law by improving law enforcement, the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) and National People's Political Consultative Conference 
(NPPCC), in the following simply described as the two sessions (liang hui, 两会), as well as 
their regional counterparts, the Provincial PC and PPCC had introduced the idea of an 
environmental police. After being an academic topic for a while, the Central Committee 
member Wang Xudong 王旭东 proposed during the 2013 “two sessions” the establishment of 
an environmental police directly under the control of the central government. 3 This would 
enable it to investigate environmental cases independently. Accordingly, there have been 
further proposals to establish environmental polices on several Chinese administrative levels.4 
The CPPCC member Pan Xiaoyan 潘晓燕 proposed the establishment of an environmental 
police again in the 2015 “two sessions”.5 Although Environmental Protection Bureaus have 
already been established on various administrative levels, they haven’t been able to improve 
environmental protection. They are often underfinanced and understaffed, as well as lacking 
significant means of enforcing environmental protection.6 Voices at the two sessions claimed 
that the low efficiency is caused by the local EPBs not having sufficient power and authority to 
establish, implement and enforce the environmental law. They are unable to control 
environmental pollution, prosecute environmental law violations and check on reported issues 
simultaneously.7 
                                                 
1 Tong, Yangqi “Bureaucracy Meets the Environment: Elite Perceptions in Six Chinese Cities“ Cambridge 
University Press, The China Quarterly, No.189, pp100-121 
2 Unknown “China’s Anti-Corruption Fight Turns Toward Environmental Agency”, 
https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/chinas-anti-corruption-fight-turns-toward-environmental-agency/ accessed: 
19.08.2017 
3 Mo Quan 墨泉 “Forging of the Environmental Police: New weapon against environmental pollution” 
http://www.hbzhan.com/news/detail/115596.html accessed: 21.09.2017 
4 Tang Shujian 唐书剑 “On the Feasibility of Constructing Environmental Police System in China我国构建环保
警察制度的可行性论析”, Journal of Sichuan Police College, Vol. 27-5, 2015 
5 Ibid. 
6 Economy, Elizabet “China’s Environmental Enforcement Glitch”, thediplomat.com, 2015,  
https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-environmental-enforcement-glitch/ accessed: 21.08.2017 
7 He Zhen 贺震 “Design of the Environmental Police as Weapon for Environmental Protection设立环境警察锻
造环保新利器”, China Environmental Protection Online, 13.03.2017 
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The concept of an Environmental Police (EP) is often proclaimed to be the solution to close the 
remaining gaps preventing an effective Environmental Protection Law (EPL) implementation. 
However, the implementation and structure behind an EP can be manifold. The aim of this 
article is to show the actual concept behind a Chinese environmental enforcement corps and 
whether it can really enforce the Chinese Environmental Law. To understand the two 
implementation and operation approaches, which have been discussed and tested by local pilot 
projects, this paper shows them exemplarily and discusses their advantages and disadvantages. 
Based on this evaluation it is possible to get a better idea of the main purpose of an EP and the 
need for a nationwide solution: By showing the concerned public that the government is taking 
care of environmental law violations, the primary goal might be to lower the number of 
environment-related major protest. Moreover, as the political terminus of “grab criminals with 
both hands” replaced with “adhere to the principle of doing two jobs at once and attaching 
equal importance to each (两手硬)” is used at multiple locations, another intention behind an 
EP might be to scare non-compliant companies by carrying out model prosecutions which act 
as a deterrent. One of the major reason for non-compliance with the new EPL might be the four 
implementation gaps, that were left wide open after environmental law reforms in 2014. These 
gaps are the limited power of the new EPL as it can be trumped by more specific and 
overlapping environmental laws, thus specialized departments could challenge EPL ruling. The 
second gap is the very fragmented structure of environmental governance in China. The third 
problem is the low level of public participation, as just approved, or more specifically 
environmental Non-Governmental-Organizations (ENGOs), are permitted to open public 
litigation suits against the government. The fourth gap is the lacking capacity of Environmental 
Protection Bureaus (EPB) to implement effective surveillance and enforcement mechanisms. 
This might be caused by still insufficient spending of the central government in EPB, resulting 
in the bureaus to be understaffed and vulnerable. They are unprotected from various offenders 
when carrying out investigation, unless the Public Security Bureau (PSB) is supporting them 
with their resources. The EP could be a solution to close some of the gaps as it could 
investigate EPL violation cases and detain suspects for a more efficient evidence collection. 
Equipped with police rights, granted by the Chinese police law, there would be sufficient tools 
available to prosecute environmental crimes and specially educated task-force-teams could 
react fast, thus lowering human caused environmental damages. After studying the available 
literature this conception must be regarded critically. Despite being the new reinforcement tool 
to finally carry out effective EPL implementation, there are still many problems, an EP cannot 
overcome without a broad preparation. To implement a separate EP-Bureau, it will be 
necessary to change the Chinese police law to permit the establishment of an EP on all levels 
and to equip it with full police rights. Furthermore, the EP cannot solve all the implementation 
problems of the 2014 EPL: to be effective, the Chinese EPL needs a superior legal status. 
Another problem might be caused by the introduction of another special police force: It is likely 
that the already complex police structure further impedes inter-department-cooperation; thus it 
was proposed to unite all environment-related police in the EP. Meanwhile the question will be 
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raised, which circumstance is making large scale environmental pollution possible and which 
role environmental ethics paly when discussing the concept of EPs.  
2. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICE IN CHINA 
2.1 The Making of the Environmental Police 
Following the revision of the environmental protection law in 2014, its implementation hasn’t 
brought the desired outcomes, yet. Low law enforcement capabilities of the local EPBs and 
China’s complex administrative structure and responsibilities has made environmental 
protection a difficult task. The idea of an environmental police has therefore been mentioned. 
As police institutions are generally responsible for law enforcement, the term “Environmental 
Police” (环境警察, EP) was introduced as countermeasure to the environmental pollution and 
polluters. The duty of this EP is expected to raise environmental protection and administrative 
law enforcement by executing criminal justice following the “grab criminals with both hands” 
replaced with “ adhere to the principle of doing two jobs at once and attaching equal 
importance to each (两手硬)” political terminus. This way problems could be addressed, which 
the local governments and their EPBs were reluctant or unable to solve. The reasons for this 
“reluctance” to act and “ineffectiveness” are elaborated in the section 2.2.  
The idea behind this is not totally new: There have already been some pilot projects on local 
level experimenting with the establishment of an “environmental protection security”, which 
will in the following be more appropriately called EP. However, they achieved mixed results. 
One issue of local solutions is, that they tend to lack in authority and means to enforce the law. 
But as the idea behind such EPs is quite promising, the design of a national standardized EP, 
equipped with powerful tools by a national guideline is highly anticipated. This is e.g. 
described in the article of the Jiangsu provincial  EPB.8 They argue that the establishment of an 
EP is an important mean to solve environmental problems by achieving environmental 
protection through environmental law enforcement and criminal law justice. Although the topic 
particularly emerged in recent literature and is being discussed intensively nowadays, the urge 
to establish an EP instance is not a recent idea of Chinese officials. This demand was already 
raised in the last two sessions (两会) and has already been a topic during the 12th national 
people’s congress.9 The establishment of a nationwide EP could be an act to strengthen the 
environmental protection and to support the weak local EPBs. Additionally, the establishment 
of an ecological civilization could be promoted. In general, there are several trends, which 
could support the development of an EP. One of them is the newly reinforced environmental 
special court.10 This instance can help to accelerate decision making and therefore enable fast 
reaction to arising human made environmental risks. In combination with the independent 
                                                 
8 He Zhen贺震, 2017 
9 He Zhen贺震, 2017 
10 J. Knudsen, Daniel “Environmental Protection Bureau, 2.0” Yale Law School, J.D.2012 
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special “law enforcement unit”, which is the in this paper described as EP, these two new 
specialized instances might allow China to tackle environmental law infliction and bridge gaps 
in its new environmental law more precisely. 
2.2 Background and Shortcomings 
Before analysing the empowerment, role and possibilities of a national EP, the background and 
shortcomings of existing local solutions are introduced. They motivate the establishment of a 
nationwide EP. On the 7th January 2017, the secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee, on 
behalf of major Cai Qi 蔡奇 announced the establishment of an environmental security police. 
Only 9 days later, on 18th of January 2017, the “Environmental, Food and Drugs and Tourism 
Security Corps” was publicly announced. This department of 50 people was called “Beijing 
Environmental Police”. In addition to the municipal level police force, the district Public 
Security Bureaus (PSBs) set up their own EP.11 Although proclaimed as an innovative idea, the 
Beijing EP wasn’t the first one of its kind. Many places have developed their own enforcement 
units in response to frequent environmental pollution and the lacking capacity of the local EPBs 
to deal with them effectively, ultimately to strengthen businesses and criminal accountability. 
Hebei – one of the most industrially polluted provinces, and being located around Beijing 
effecting millions of citizens has designed a so called “green public security” （绿色共安） in 
Anping county. This police department was already set up in 2006 and was concerned with 
environmental protection. Other examples can be seen in Shandong, where the Shandong 
Provincial PSB set up a “Food and Drug and Environmental Crime investigation corps” in 
August 2012 or a little bit different kind of environmental security office being established on 
the Hebei provincial level 2013 in cooperation with the PSB. Besides such individual 
approaches, the system used in Jiangsu is even broader: In June 2015, the Jiangsu Provincial 
PSB set up a “food and environmental crime investigation corps”. Until now, all 13 Jiangsu 
districts and municipalities PSBs have set up special detachments, which are stationed in the 
Environmental Protection Agency. They also established an EP room to jointly handle the 
implementation of administrative and criminal law enforcement.12  The following quotation 
shows the present situation quite visually: 
“So far, Hebei, Jinan, Qingdao and Kunming have established EP offices to explore 
ways to strengthen environmental governance. However, harsh measures can be 
difficult to deploy in any but the most egregious cases of violations. Occasionally, 
enforcement by way of ‘killing the chicken to scare the monkey’ can be effective; but 
if chickens run out, enforcement should keep an eye on the monkey. Therefore, 
routine monitoring and record-keeping, inspections, and fines for less severe 
                                                 
11 He Zhen贺震, 2017 
12 He Zhen贺震, 2017 
Volume 12, No. 4 
38 
violations may be at least as important as these severe measures in fostering 
compliance.”13  
Such vast responsibilities require a well-developed EP structure. One of the first pilots was the 
Yunnan Province, Kunming city EP, which was labelled as being “successful”. This success 
was used to elevate the Kunming EP to a national model role. But why was it proclaimed as 
being so successful and was it really? To briefly evaluate it, here are the basic facts: The 
Kunming EP was founded mid-2008 to counteract the environmental crisis that occurred at 
Yangzhong Hai 阳宗海: after industrial sewages were dumped into the lake for a long period 
the lake’s arsenic concentration climbed an excessive level. This high level of arsenic was toxic 
and therefore the water was rated harmful, moreover, its danger to health even exceeded the 
scale of the Chinese river and lake water quality rating scale (rating water quality on a scale 
from 1 (good) to 5 (serious danger to health)).14 The causing company was already put on the 
national “blacklist” for environmental polluters (a list to publish repeated environmental 
pollution offenders). Eventually they were punished by the local EPB several times post-2002, 
but the punishment was too insignificant to show any effect. Especially as the measures for 
sewage cleaning were probably exceeding the costs of the fees, which was and is a significant 
problem of the pre-2014 Environmental Protection law. Finally, the company continued with its 
pollution of the lake regardless the effects on environment and local population.15 This incident 
is said to be the direct cause for the creation of the Kunming Municipal Security Bureau 
Environmental Protection Branch. As local EPB inspectors were either unwilling or unable to 
carry out effective enforcement or supervision 16 , it gave rise to the need to develop an 
enforcement mechanism to answer the incapability. This led to a cooperation of the EPB and 
the PSB which was founded in the form of the Kunming EP. Together they work out feasible 
solutions for environmental monitoring end environmental law enforcement. The EPs main 
duty is to support the work of the EPB and to enhance its possibilities for routine inspections as 
well as in environmental emergencies.17 Until then, the Kunming EP handled 96 environmental 
cases and supported the local EPB with its enforcement more than 400 times (until 2012).18 
Despite these numbers, the truth behind them is more or less sobering: Among the 96 
                                                 
13 Zhang Bo; Cao Cong; Gu Junzhan; Liu Ting “A New Environmental Protection Law, Many Old Problems? 
Challenges to Environmental Governance in China” Oxford Journal of Environmental Law, 2016, 28, 325–335 
14 Zhao Yuhong “Innovative measures to improve environmental law enforcement in China” China-EU School of 
Law, Hong Kong, 2014 
15 Long Yuqin, Wang Dianxue龙玉琴 王殿学 “Will Environmental Police Tackle the Problem of Weak 
Enforcement”, Southern Metropolitan Daily 2013 http://roll.sohu.com/20130624/n379628156.shtml accessed: 
20.09.2017 
16 Van Rooij, Benjamin “Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law: Regular Enforcement and Political 
Campaigns”,2006,    
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/12533/artdandcFinalPubversion.pdf?sequence=1 accessed: 
30.08.2017 
17 Zhao Yuhong, 2014 
18 Long Yuqin, Wang Dianxue龙玉琴 王殿学 2013 
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environmental cases solved, there are only 6 significant ones with criminal law enforcement. 
According to Protection Bureau Director Wang Likun 王丽昆, most cases the Kunming EP 
handled are law and order cases, such as noise nuisance. He also states, that the underlying 
problem is a legal one as environmental pollution can be legally pursued and fined, but in order 
for environmental pollution to be considered an offense in criminal law sense, it must fulfil 
high conditions like significant environmental damages or harmed health of citizens. 19  To 
conclude, the statistics appear impressive, but the real efficiency of the EP in Kunming is 
questionable. Despite this, any solved environmental case might be improving the 
environmental condition and suits as a deterrent for further polluters. 
In Shandong, the local environmental law enforcement model is following another 
organizational scheme: It is mandatory for the EPB and PSB to inspect the monitoring 
equipment, waste treatment and the emittance of emissions once in half a year in a huge joint 
operation to catch polluters.20 This might have an insignificant effect on polluters as the date of 
the control is officially announced and the companies can prepare beforehand, but their goal 
might be recognized by the Chinese public as institutions that are fighting the environmental 
polluters with the often advertised “iron fist”21 – thus maintaining political stability. Finally, the 
EP has emerged as a political tool to soothe the high tendency of environmental pollution 
related protests. Although opinions about the success of local solutions for EPs diverge, the 
cases show the potential of a centralized EP. 
2.3 Need for an EP 
The exemplary cases described before indicate the need of a nationwide implementation of EPs. 
As stated in prior research, the understaffed local EPBs are unable to carry out effective 
environmental protection. Their abilities suffice neither for environmental supervision nor for 
environmental law enforcement. 22  Environmental law enforcement has gained a new 
significance as the Chinese Supreme Court issued a new judicial interpretation in December 
2016: Environmental pollution and obstruction of environmental surveillance are now punished 
with serious consequences thus elevating the environmental law enforcement and 
environmental monitoring to a much higher significance. The report cited the case of 
employees of the local EPB who were tampering with environmental surveillance devices in 
order to prevail the detection of emissions exceeding the regulatory limit.23 This new event 
supports the argument of establishing an EP - to act independently from but supplementing to 
                                                 
19 Long Yuqin, Wang Dianxue龙玉琴 王殿学 2013 
20 Long Yuqin, Wang Dianxue龙玉琴 王殿学 2013 
21 He Zhen贺震, 2017 
22 Kostka, Genia “Barriers to the Implementation of Environmental Policies at the Local Level in China”, World 
Bank, 2014, 22f 
23 Davies Paul, Westgate Andrew „China focuses on Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws” 
http://www.latham.london/2017/01/china-focuses-on-criminal-enforcement-of-environmental-laws/ accessed 
19.08.2017 
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the EPBs and PSBs. Another important reason for EPs is its meaning for the public audience. 
Reducing environmental pollution by enacting more effective law enforcement is a qualified 
method. But instead of just improving supervised law enforcement, the EP offers the possibility 
to remind polluters that there is an effective persecution instance operating, and thus possibly 
lowering the eventuality of environmental crimes. Yet there are more arguments to support the 
establishment of an independent environmental law enforcement unit. The quite sophisticated 
environmental law - as revised 2014 - hasn’t been effectively implemented at local level yet. 
One reason is the prior stated insufficient capacity of the EPBs but another factor is the 
unwillingness of companies’ management to comply with the environmental law. The deterrent 
effect of the likeliness of a punishment or the coverage of official supervision is not sufficient. 
A more powerful, independent and nationwide acting instance is needed. How such an 
institution can be set up and organized is described in the following. 
3. IMPLEMENTATION OF CENTRALIZED EP 
3.1 Organizational Structure 
Similarly to the many different organizational structures of the local EPs, also different 
organization types for a central EP are being discussed. Referring to the Environmental Article, 
there are two proposed modes of operation for the EP: integrated (入驻式) and independent (独
立警种).24 The integrated mode proposes a joint-local PSB and EP Bureau by setting up a 
shared office and having police officers monitor environmental supervision equipment and 
proceeding the environmental law enforcement. The staff will be consisting of police officers 
from the local PSB with special training. Legally, the new EP isn’t a new police department but 
an addition to existing PSB departments. The Hebei province Anping county EP is an example 
for the integrated department. Founded already in March 2006, it is the first Chinese EP being 
implemented in a local-PSB department. The second mode is the establishment of a new EP 
department as a “special police”.25 This way specialized police officers can focus on criminal 
and environmental law enforcement in tight cooperation with the environmental courts and the 
local EPBs. A source cited, that a collaboration between the EP and the local PSB can be just a 
temporary solution and it is necessary to build up an independent police bureau like the 
“forestry police” and “traffic police”. 26  However, Wei Rujiu 魏汝久  argued that it is 
unnecessary to further complicate the Chinese police system. Following the implementation of 
more specialized security departments, it is likely that other governmental offices will request 
specialized police bureaus as well, duplicating the administrative separation and making 
cooperation less-likely.27 The first independent EP was established in November 2011 as the 
                                                 
24 Unknown “Two law enforcement modes for the environmental police 环保警察的两种执法模式” Legaldaily 
法制日报, 2015 http://legal.people.com.cn/n/2015/0102/c188502-26312399.html accessed: 21.08.2017 
25 Ibid. 
26  He Zhen 贺震, 2017 
27 Long Yuqin, Wang Dianxue龙玉琴, 王殿学, 2013 
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“Kunming Public Environmental Protection Police Department” in Yunnan Province. Referring 
to the already made evaluation, there were slightly more advantages regarding this department, 
thus most of the disadvantages were caused by legal lags, which were addressed in the 2014 
environmental law reform. While a cooperation between EP and PSB could be implemented in 
short time by using the available resources, the effectivity strongly depends on the used 
monitoring and investigating equipment as well as on the expertise of the polices’ officers in 
dealing with environmental cases. Nevertheless, it is questionable that a cooperation between 
both institutions can be implemented in short time as the local governments have a huge 
influence in environmental cases and might be reluctant to establish a high responsive system 
in order to remain in control.28 Despite punishing environmental targets gains in importance 
and the performance based evaluation on meeting environmental targets is adding up pressure, 
pursuing personal interests and relations still poses a serious threat. Nevertheless, the above-
mentioned modes of operation hold possibilities as the EP could ease the EPBs monitoring and 
enforcement responsibility and thus make the surveillance of heavy polluters more efficient. 
The cooperation with the local PSB itself might enable the EP to use already existing 
infrastructure and personnel to perform a quick start into operation.  
3.2 Concerning Employees and Public Participation 
Following the discussion about the organization mode of the EPs, another important question 
has to be considered: Are environmental inspectors EP employees and will they therefore get 
better means of enforcement? A big problem of today’s environmental inspectors is the 
evidence collection obstruction imposed by local industries and other unknown players. 29 
Investigators, mostly EPB inspectors get criminally offended and their equipment is being 
tampered with. The purpose of these actions is to hinder the collection of evidences and to 
obstruct the prosecution of environmental crimes. As the collection of evidences in 
environmental cases is very time sensitive and quick action is required to collect sensible 
sources, even a small delay can cause the entire case to be dropped at court due to lack of 
evidence. 30  This interference indicates that the work carried out by the EPB inspectors is 
insufficiently protected by law. Environmental inspectors do not have the right to enforce 
necessary steps to detain criminals or to close polluting factories directly. They need the 
authority from the local governments and the help of the PSB to enact punishment. An EP 
would need the necessary authority to quickly intervene in issues, to start an investigation and 
to set up management detention to accelerate the jurisdictional process. According to the 
Chinese police law, the EP would be authorized to investigate and enforce environmental cases 
independently if there is suspicion. By accelerating the process and having the possibility to use 
the investigation methods of an acknowledged police (such as suspect detention and 
                                                 
28 Ran Ran (2013) Perverse Incentive Structure and Policy Implementation Gap in China’s local environmental 
politics” Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, 2013, Taylor & Francis, p18 
29 He Zhen 贺震, 2017 
30 He Zhen贺震, 2017 
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compulsory seizure), time and money could be saved as well as the direct risk for a polluter to 
get caught is much more feasible.  
Following the new law, the EPBs or EPs can act not only if they detect an environmental 
polluter. They can get more direct help from other parties. The 2014 revised environmental law 
provides more parties, such as ENGOs (if preconditions are met), with the possibility to open 
environmental law suits and public litigation suits. 31  For a case to be accepted at an 
environmental court it is necessary to collect evidences which again would profit greatly from 
an accelerated response time of the EP. Another method of public participation is to address the 
local administration with letters. This tool, usually used by residents, is a vent for larger public 
participation and they give residents a claim for compensation for their loss of life quality due 
to environmental pollution caused by factories.32 The letters usually don’t require a trial but ask 
for a mediator and direct indemnity. But as the number of environmental related protest in 
China is rising, a more effective tool of participation for the broader public would be 
beneficial.33 By establishing a national and regional EP this tool of participation would be 
created. By permitting residents to file cases against polluters, investigators could act fast to 
secure the evidence thus accelerating the general progress of an environmental trial.34 There 
might be some intervention from local governments in the beginning, but finally the legitimacy 
of the Communist Party is closely linked to the success of its programs. And contrary to 
economics growth or energy consumption it is easier for every citizen to verify the grade of 
environmental pollution. Just recently a report stated that an entire school suffered under the 
illegal dumping of highly toxic chemical waste in a nearby area in Changzhou. Parents of the 
children needed to get a 3rd party investigation team to collect and analyse samples. 35 This 
example states that the national investigation teams were too slow and reluctant to react to this 
incident.  
3.3 Environmental Ethics 
The rising number of major Chinese environmental protests already shows that the public 
awareness for environmental protection has seen a rise, mostly due to the signs of the deterrent 
present condition of natural resources such as air and water quality. There is a large pool of 
academic papers analysing the state of Chinese natural resources available.36While the results 
                                                 
31 Zhang Bo, Cao Cong, Gu Junzhan, Liu Ting, 2016 
32 Zhang Shijun “The Non-litigation Approach to Environmental Disputes in China” in Environmental Policy and 
Governance in China, Springer Japan, 2017 
33 Upton John “Pollution spurs more Chinese Protests than any other issue” 2013, http://grist.org/news/pollution-
spurs-more-chinese-protests-than-any-other-issue/ access: 01.09.2017 
34 He Zhen 贺震, 2017 
35 Zhang, Chun “Changzhou pollution scandal highlights holes in China’s environmental 
Enforcement”,https://www.thethirdpole.net/2016/05/05/changzhou-pollution-scandal-highlights-holes-in-chinas-
environmental-enforcement/ , accessed 13.09.2017 
36 Qu Jiuhui, Fan Maohong, “The Current State of Water Quality and Technology Development for Water 
Pollution Control in China” http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10643380802451953 accessed: 21.09.2017 
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of the economic development can be seen, there is still a huge demand to expand the 
environmental ethics. Environmental ethics refer to the sum of moral norms and the 
relationship between human and nature and therefore are observed in the way of how humans 
understand the effect of their actions on the environment. Environmental ethics are a key 
content of the Chinese policy to form an ecological civilization. But furthermore, the public 
education could be strongly promoted by the EP as it would strengthen the negative meaning of 
environmental pollution. 37  Another problem mentioned is the low scale of perception for 
environmental damages. Tang states, that most citizens are just concerned about the 
environmental damages as they see themselves endangered by the air pollution in their 
surroundings. This raises the question of how aware the citizens are of the present condition of 
the Chinese air, water and soil resources and whether the protests would decline after the 
causes for the air pollution have been banned from the larger urban areas.  
3.4 Problems of the post 2014 EPL 
Publications analysing the revised Chinese Environmental Protection law of 2014 have shown 
clearly that the new design possesses serious gaps which might hinder the successful 
implementation of the new law. Bo Zhang, Cong Cao, Junzhan Gu and Ting Liu name in their 
paper five key problems. These are as follows: the insufficient status of the EPL (Environment 
Protection Law) compared with competing laws of same legal relevance, the fragmented and 
overlapping structure of Chinese environmental governance, the prone-to-intervention law 
enforcements as local EPBs report to the local governments, the failure to pronounce and 
acknowledge environmental rights of a citizen, and the power over penalties is not fully 
delegated as EPBs must get the local governmental approval for penalty enforcement. In the 
following, these problems are discussed in more detail and the possibilities, the EP offers to 
bridge them, are described. The power of the Environment Protection Law is limited by 
competing specific laws. These are for example the agriculture law, the forestry law and other 
laws concerning the usage and protection of natural resources. 38  Any judgement of the 
environmental court based on the environmental law, could be objected if there are other 
standards defined in the specific law. To avoid this situation, it is necessary to give the 
environmental protection the status of a basic environmental protection legislation [as done by 
many other developed countries]. Another way would be to educate EP officers in the standards 
of all specified legal standards. This way they could apply their knowledge when investigating 
and supervising environmental cases and avoid acting in overlapping legal areas. Still, despite 
the possibility an EP would offer, the problem of the competing laws would remain. It would 
offer violators to operate in the competing “grey zones” to outplay the environmental law with 
the specific law and vice versa. Thus, rendering legal enforcement and punishment ineffective. 
The second gap is the enforcement gap of the overlapping structure of Chinese environmental 
governance. The cooperation and supervision between the central Ministry of Environmental 
                                                 
37 2-13 Tang Shujian唐书剑, 2015 
38 4-11 Zhang Bo, Cao Cong, 2015 
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Protection (MEP) and the local EPBs is limited to the administrative structure of the PRC and 
the corresponding ministries in environmental protection. For example, the Carbon Tax is 
supervised by the Chinese NDRC – the National Development and Reform Commission. This 
complicates the structured implementation of the environmental law. The EP is a powerful tool 
to fight environmental law violations and for quick response to local environmental crisis. But 
unfortunately, there is no clear possibility for the EP to change the political and 
administrational layout of the PRC. These are best addressed by policy making in the National 
People’s Congress and its standing committee. Despite this situation, a chance for intervention 
for EPs might be to combine the EPB authority together with the responsibilities of the NDRC. 
For example, using the newly established Emissions Trade System, where the EP could support 
emissions’ law enforcement and punish violators. The third shortcoming of the Chinese EPL in 
comparison with other country’s EPL is the lack to acknowledge the basic right for every 
citizen of a “fit for life” environment.39 The drawback is that under the 2014 EPL citizens and 
environmental Non-Governmental-Organizations (ENGO) have the right to see detailed 
environment monitoring information, published by the EPB40 but just some ENGOs, that met 
the preconditions, are permitted to bring lawsuits against the government (for lack of air or 
water quality). This issue can’t be addressed by the establishment of the EP directly. 
Nevertheless, the EP might improve the general situation as citizen would have an institution, 
which they can address directly when discovering possible violations of environmental law and 
seeing their health endangered. This could serve as a possibility of broader public participation 
and give citizens a mean to address their questions and leads. These in turn, can help to solve 
present investigation cases. The fourth issue mentioned was the lack of capacities and 
possibilities in enforcement and implementation of the EPL.41 The main purpose of the EP 
would be the enforcement of the environmental law. After the local EPB has determined the 
means of local EPL implementation, the EP can monitor the compliance, start investigation on 
bad performers, and therefore release pressure from the EPB.  
3.5 Establishment of a legal foundation 
Although the idea of the EP being a police institution has been discussed before, there is no 
legal basis in the police law of the People’s Republic of China to support the nationwide 
establishment of an EP yet. An addition for protecting the environment and to ensure the 
enforcement of the environmental law should be added to Article 6 of the Chinese police law. 
Just after this modification, the EP would have the same status as, for example the maritime 
police. This would establish the legal basis for the building of an EP and equip it with the same 
tools and legal possibilities as any Chinese police bureau under the Chinese police law.42 After 
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the legal foundation is established, it will be necessary to implement the EP in the existing 
police infrastructure and to procure necessary equipment. Therefore, the Jiangsu provincial 
EPB made five proposals43: 
First: Establishing educational facilities for environmental protection supervision and law 
enforcement and to train the new personnel. One of the main contents of this measure is the 
education training of environmental officers in environmental and resource protection law, 
environmental science, ecology and other general knowledge to improve the EP officers’ 
professionalism and law enforcement capabilities. Additional to these specific skill, an EP 
inspector is required to be experienced in general police’ business skills.44 This training is the 
general foundation of the EP building proposal. Second, the EP should collaborate with 
institutions with environment-related areas of competence, such as for land, housing 
construction, water conservancy (agriculture), forestry, transportation, and others.45 This way 
the EP would dispose of diverse connections, which will ease the treating of emergency cases 
and lower the response and handling time. As stated before, a quick response time is necessary 
to prevail and reduce negative effects on environment and residents. Third, EPBs and their 
monitoring capabilities and environmental monitoring agencies are requested to promote the 
work of the EP with the establishment of a technical support mechanism for EP work.46 A joint 
execution of data collection can help the EP by planning work measure more effectively and 
enabling it to use a broader network of supporting tools in data collection. An important point 
to establish the law enforcement capabilities of the EP mentioned the fourth demand. It will be 
necessary to build a specialized unit for prosecution environmental crimes but also, to 
incorporate public interest litigation mechanisms, while securing the citizen’s basic rights. 
Finally, the EP should be an independent police unit to prevent the environmental regulatory 
authorities from a strong influence on the PSB and to focus their work on the environmental 
field.  
Another proposal has been made by Tang Shujian 唐书剑: He supports the idea, that an 
additional EP would complicate the responsibilities of the Chinese special polices and provide 
additional obstacles to legal enforcement in correlating special environmental laws. Tang 
proposes the creation of a unified law enforcement bureau for all special laws. This way 
enforcement efforts could be organized and the rivalries of the special polices could be 
cancelled. This idea seems reasonable but its feasibility is strongly linked to the Chinese 
legislation. As long as there are special laws with each determining own environmental 
standards, it still would be possible to unite the enforcement departments but the general 
condition of the conflicting laws on equal levels would still consist. 
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3.6 Solutions outside of China 
China is not the only country which needs to deal with environmental pollution and polluters. 
Three exemplary setups, once the Russian Moscow EP, US EP, and Brazilian EP, are shortly 
depicted in the following to get a broader view of the perspectives of an EP. In general, each 
country’s quite unique policy and political layout makes it hard to draw direct comparison with 
other nation’s environmental enforcement systems.  
Zhang Bin 张彬 stated in his publication, that the Russian EP indicates a local, yet broader 
approach.47 In 1996 the Moscow city government and the Russian Interior Ministry decided to 
use municipal governments’ funds to pay for the establishment of the Russian EP. They 
allocated 40 Million Rubles to build the 1100 officer strong Moscow City EP which has to 
fulfil a broad list of competences. Despite the three main functions, prevention of 
environmental and administrative crimes, provision of security to environmental protection 
staff during their normal activities and supervision of urban and other natural reserves, they 
also have to supervise garbage disposal, check environmental protection measures during 
construction and dismantling, as well as factories and their mandatory environmental protection 
equipment for functionality as well as check markets and shops for food hygiene. To strengthen 
the deterrent effect on polluters, they have a broad media presence in newspapers and TV-
reports. Moreover, they have an educational program in schools. Compared with the 2017 
established Beijing EP, the Moscow solution is shifting tasks of the Chinese EPB to the EP and 
strengthening the EP to be able to carry out effective measures to protect the environment and 
guarantee citizens health.  
Brazil, another member of the BRICs-States, started in 2008 to blacklist municipalities, that 
have a high rate of illegal deforestation as “Priority Municipalities”48. This procedure allows 
the “Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Resources” to prioritize these 
blacklisted municipalities in the supervision and enforcement activities of the national 
environmental police and law enforcement authority. By focusing their work on the bad 
performers, the deforestation of the Amazonas rainforest was lowered by 35% between 2008 
and 2011. Despite this success, Assunção and Rocha stated that the policy had no negative 
impact on other economic activities. Meanwhile Daniel Araujo Miranda and Daniel Russo 
showed, that Inteligeo – a web system to gather and contain data for forensic analysis, supports 
the Brazilian EP forensic teams and simplifies data access. The system is using an online map 
and is displaying areas which have related information highlighted. This way, an investigation 
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teams might check the present area for prior environmental cases and access data related to 
emissions prevention.49 
The most famous Environmental Enforcement Unit is the US-EP. Is was established in 1982 by 
the US Department of Justice to form a special task force to fight environmental crimes und to 
sanction environmental pollution. After the Congress granted this task force full enforcement 
powers in 1988 the US-EP was charged with tasks containing but not limited to: implementing 
pollution control measures, to investigate civil and criminal environmental crimes such as the 
illegal handling of hazardous substances. At present, the OCEFT has 200 full time federal 
environment law enforcement officers. Beneath the Federal EPA, some states have established 
their own specialized EP, such as New York in 1983. The New York EP is investigating 400 
complaints every year, of which 500 involve environmental crime. In 2002 New York opened 
its first EP-Academy where students are required to undergo a 31-week comprehensive training. 
An important feature of the federal EP are the professionally trained environmental law 
enforcement officers as well as the broad team of professionals (scientists, forensic specialists) 
to support the work of the EP.50  
4.  CONCLUSION 
To conclude, an EP might be a good solution to address environmental pollution and corporate 
misbehavior. Moreover, it would offer a chance to bridge some gaps the 2014 EPL left and 
meanwhile strengthen the party’s legitimacy. The deterrent effect on the public caused by 
police prosecution would spill over to polluters raising the suspicion that they might get caught 
and the high penalty rates, introduced by the new EPL might find broad application. The first 
impression of the Beijing EP raises the question whether the banning of street food and 
investigation in minor environmental offenders as in the Kunming EP holds any fruits. Despite 
the advantages, the success of the EP strongly depends on its implementation and whether the 
according legal framework has been modified to authorize it as legal special police of the PRC. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to elevate the EPL to avoid conflicts with more specialized 
environmental laws. The establishment of another specialized environmental police bureau 
might be an advantage to enforce the EPL but for the environmental situation to be improved in 
long term, it will be necessarily to modify the EPL and to close its implementation gaps by 
investing more resources in its enforcement and compliance. To our mind, even the prosecution 
of insignificant environmental polluters can raise the public awareness for environmental 
protection and thus enhance the pressure on other polluters. On a large scale, this can only be 
done by introducing a nationwide concept instead of fractured local solutions. Before a country 
as huge and geographically diverted as China could be completely controlled by an EP, it will 
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be necessary to raise public awareness for environmental pollution as well as to permit more 
public actors to participate in the environmental protection. The high amount of yearly 
environmental protests shows already a raised public awareness and permitting specific ENGOs 
to file law litigation suits was already a good start to enhance the fight against environmental 
pollution.  
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